A rebuttable presumption that a mutually agreed upon amount of child support in an unincorporated separation agreement is just and reasonable. The Pataky presumption was established in Pataky v. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 404 (2003), aff’d per curiam in part, review dismissed in part, 359 N.C. 65, 602 S.E.2d 360 (2004).
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
“The parol evidence rule provides that when parties have formally and explicitly expressed their contract in writing, that contract shall not be contradicted or changed by prior or contemporaneous oral agreements.” Lancaster v. Lancaster, 138 N.C. App. 459, 530 S.E.2d 82 (2000).
See: extrinsic evidence
When addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction on appeal, North Carolina courts use “a two-step analysis.” Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 119, 638 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2006).“First, jurisdiction over the action must be authorized by N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4, our state’s long-arm statute.” Id.at 119, 638 S.E.2d at 208 (citation omitted). “Second, if the long-arm statute permits consideration of the action, exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” Id.at 119, 638 S.E.2d at 208.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 is commonly referred to as the long-arm statute. Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1) “requires some sort of ‘activity’ to be conducted by the defendant within this state.” Skinner, 361 N.C. at 119, 638 S.E.2d at 208.
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESUMPTION (vs inference: Smith v. Bohlen)
PRIMA FACE CASE
Tucker 344 NC 411
Smith 334 NC 81
PUBLIC OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Public official immunity precludes a suit against a public official in his individual capacity and protects him from liability as long as the public official “lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption[.]” Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430 (1976) (citation omitted).
Public official immunity is “a derivative form of sovereign immunity.” Epps v. Duke Univ., Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 203, 468 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1996).
It is well settled that absent evidence to the contrary, it will always be presumed that public officials will discharge their duties in good faith and exercise their powers in accord with the spirit and purpose of the law. This presumption places a heavy burden on the party challenging the validity of public officials’ actions to overcome this presumption by competent and substantial evidence. Strickland v. Hedrick, 194 N.C. App. 1, 10, 669 S.E.2d 61, 68 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To rebut the presumption and hold a public official liable in his individual capacity, a plaintiff’s complaint must allege, and the facts alleged must support a conclusion, “that [the official’s] act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious, or ‘that [the official] acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.’” Doe v. Wake Cty., 264 N.C. App. 692, 695-96, 826 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2019) (citation omitted).